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FLAGIELLO v. PENNSYLVANIA HOSP.: IS CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY REALLY DEAD IN PENNSYLVANIA?
Following the trend developed in other jurisdictions,' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp .2 has abolished the defense
of charitable immunity for hospitals. This Note will examine the reasons used
by the court in abrogating charitable immunity as to hospitals in an effort to
determine whether or not they are applicable to other charitable organizations.
Mrs. Mary Flagiello suffered injuries due to a fall while she was a
patient at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia. She and
her husband sued the hospital in trespass alleging that her injuries were caused
by the negligence of the defendant's employees. The hospital moved for a
judgment on the pleadings averring that it was an eleemosynary institution
engaged in a charitable enterprise and was therefore immune from liability.
The lower court granted the defendant's motion and plaintiff appealed to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In Pennsylvania, charitable organizations have been immune from tort
liability since 1888 when Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd3 held that a "public charity,
whether incorporated or not, is but a trustee and is bound to apply its funds
in furtherance of the charity and not otherwise."'4 Boyd relied upon the
English case of Feoffes of Heriots Hosp. v. Ross5 which was tacitly overruled
by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs" twenty two years before the Boyd deci-
sion. Thus, charitable immunity, already dead in England, was given a new
life in Pennsylvania.
While the propriety of the immunity doctrine was rarely questioned, the
Pennsylvania courts began to assign divergent explanations for its justifica-
tion. They can be categorized as follows: (1) The "trust fund" theory, i.e.,
that the funds and property of these institutions are held in trust and cannot
be diverted to purposes other than those designated in the trust ;7 (2) that
1. PROSSER, TORTS § 127 (3d ed. 1964). The states which have abandoned charitable
immunity completely are Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. In addition Ohio and Washington
have terminated the immunity as to charitable hospitals but left it as to other charitable
organizations.
2. 208 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1965).
3. 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
4. Id. at 647, 15 Ati. at 557.
5. 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
6. XI H.L.C. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866). Feoffes had relied upon the dicta of
Lord Cottenham in Duncan v. Findlater, 6 C. & F. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839) :
To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects
whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely
different purpose.
Id. at 897, 7 Eng. Rep. 936. Duncan was expressly overruled by Mersey Dock.
7. Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888). See also Parks
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the doctrine of "respondeat superior" cannot be extended so as to apply to
charitable institutions because such institutions are not operated for profit ;s
(3) the "implied waiver" theory, i.e., that entering a hospital for treatment
and accepting the services rendered is a "waiver" of all rights to claim damages
for injuries suffered as a result of the negligence of the hospital or its em-
ployees ;9 (4) "stare decisis" requires the court's retention of the rule and any
change in the law must be wrought by a legislative enactment.' 0
The "trust fund" theory assumes that charitable immunity fosters public
donations and that all charitable organizations rely heavily on such donations
for their existence. As was pointed out by Justice Musmanno in Flagiello:
"In 1963, the fees received from patients in the still designated charitable
hospitals throughout Pennsylvania constituted 90.92% of the total income
of the hospitals."" Such statistics unquestionably illustrate the financial self-
sufficiency of hospitals in Pennsylvania. Perhaps even more significant is the
fact that the appellee-hospital was unable to convince the court that the
imposition of liability would dissuade prospective donors from making con-
tributions. The majority cited the opinion of Justice Rutledge in Georgetown
College v. Hughes,'2 which held the contrary to be true. Justice Rutledge
stated :
There are also reasons which take force away from the fears of dis-
sipation and deterrence of donations. No statistical evidence has been
presented to show that the mortality or crippling of charities has been
greater in states which impose full or partial liability than where
complete or substantially full immunity is given. Nor is there evi-
dence that deterrence of donation has been greater in the former.
Charities seem to survive and increase in both with little apparent
heed to whether they are liable for torts .... 13
Obviously, the basis of the immunity rule is not logically explained by the
"trust fund" rationale.
The appellees argued in Flagiello that the doctrine of respondeat superior
v. Northwestern Univ., 218 Il1. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905); Eads v. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n, 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W.2d 701 (1930); Williams v. Randolph Hosp., 237
N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).
8. Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59
(1946). See also Evans v. Lawrence Hosp., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A.2d 433 (1946) ; Emery
v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921) ; Thornton v. Franklin Square
House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N.E. 909 (1909).
9. Wilcox v. Idaho Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938) ; St. Vincent's
Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924); Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium, 92
Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120 (1912).
10. Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College, 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961);
Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
11. 208 A.2d at 198 (Pa. 1965).
12. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
13. Id. at 823.
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was inapplicable to charities since they are non-profit organizations. This
proposition had been previously accepted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh.14 However, such a
restrictive interpretation of the doctrine does violence to the purposes for
which it was created. Professor Prosser points out the fallacy of such an
interpretation :
.. . the vicarious liability of a master is certainly not limited to
profitable businesses, and it rests rather upon his employment of the
servant, his direction and control over the act, and the furtherance
of an enterprise which he has set in motion. If he derives profit from
the enterprise that might serve as an added reason for making him
take the responsibility; but the reason for making him bear the loss in
the first instance is complete without the addition.15
In refuting the "respondeat superior" argument, the majority in Flagiello
point out that the imposition of liability on the hospital will induce it to
exercise greater care and caution in selecting and training its personnel.1
Of all the arguments advanced by the proponents of the immunity rule,
undoubtedly the "waiver theory" is the most indefensible. Based upon
fiction, it completely ignores the realities of contractual requisites. A simple
factual situation should explain. Consider the patient entering a hospital in
an unconscious position, or the infant patient who is either too young to under-
stand or be bound by the terms of a contractual waiver. Unquestionably, few
hospitals would announce in advance a policy of requiring such a waiver as
a condition of entrance, and few patients would enter under such a condition
unless forced to do so by poverty. 17 Fortunately, the Pennsylvania courts have
never utilized the "implied waiver" fiction in order to justify the rule of
immunity.'8
The dissenting opinion in Flagiello advocates a strict adherence to the
doctrine of stare decisis as the basis for upholding charitable immunity. 19
14. 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946) :
However, as far as pennsylvania is concerned, the law on this subject is
perfectly clear ... that the rule of respond eat superior does not apply in the case
of injuries occasioned by the negligence of the agents or servants of a charitable
organization.
Id. at 416, 45 A.2d at 62.
15. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 127.
16. Justice Musmanno states:
Human nature being what it is, administrators of a hospital, cognizant that
the hospital is insulated from tort liability, may be less likely to exercise
maximum scrutiny in selecting personnel than if the hospital were held mon-
etarily liable for the slipshod, indifferent, and neglectful conduct of employees.
208 A.2d at 202 (Pa. 1965).
17. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
18. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 127.
19. Justice Bell stated: "I am very greatly disturbed by the virtual extirpation of
1965]
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While the stability and certainty wrought by the doctrine provide necessary
standards to guide man's conduct, the majority in Flagiello have refused to
blindly perpetuate the immunity law on that basis alone. Justice Musmanno
points out that courts must be sensitive to the changes in the times which may
require the abandonment of an antiquated law. 20 The eminent Mr. Justice
Cardozo once warned of the pitfalls of stare decisis:
. . . we must not perpetrate an obsolete rule by blind adherence to
the principle of stare decisis. Although adherence to that principle is
generally a wise course of judicial action, it does not rigidly command
that we follow without deviation earlier pronouncements which are
unsuited to modern experience and which no longer adequately serve
the interests of justice. Surely, the orderly development of the law
must be responsive to new conditions and to the persuasion of
superior reasoning.
21
While it is safe to assume that the immunity of hospitals in Pennsylvania
has been abrogated by Flagiello, the decision makes no reference as to its
possible effect on other charitable organizations. 2 Rather the majority
concludes: "We, therefore, overrule Michael v. Hahnemann and all other
decisions of identical effect, and hold that the hospital's liability must be
governed by the same principles of law as apply to other employers.
'2
Assuming that the inclusion of the word "identical" indicated the court's
intent to restrict the decision to hospital cases, Pennsylvania may have decided
to follow the courts of Ohio and Washington which have promulgated a policy
of partial imunity for charitable institutions other than hospitals.
Thus in Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp.,24 the Supreme Court
of Washington held that a charitable hospital is liable for the torts of its
the principle of stare decisis, on which the House of Law was built." 208 A.2d at 213
(Pa. 1965).
20. In discussing the legal justification for abandoning stare decisis, Justice
Musmanno states:
Of course, the precedents here recalled do not justify a light and casual
treatment of the doctrine of stare decisis but they proclaim unequivocally that
where Justice demands, reason dictates, equality enjoins and fair play decrees
a change in judge-made law, courts will not lack in determination to establish
that change.
208 A.2d at 207, 208 (1965).
21. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150, 151 (1921).
22. The dissenting opinion, however, construes the majority opinion as extirpating
all charitable immunity. Justice Bell states:
By eliminating charitable immunity for nonprofit, charitable hospitals, the
majority opinion likewise abolishes it for churches, schools, and universities,
homes for the blind, homes for the aged, homes for the crippled or retarded or
homeless children, Catholic Home Shelter and five other Catholic child-care
institutions, convents, religious organizations of many denominations, the Salva-
tion Army, the Y.M.C.A., and in short for every other charity. ...
208 A.2d at 210 (Pa. 1965).
23. Ibid.
24. 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
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servants. Two years later the same court in the case of Lyon v. Tumwater
Evangelical Free Church,2 5 held a nonprofit religious organization immune
from liability. The court stated:
Appellant contends that the rule of charitable immunity has been
rejected by the Pierce case, and therefore the doctrine of respondeat
superior applies to ecclesiastical bodies. We do not wish to extend the
above holding to apply to a nonprofit, religious organization which
transports children, without charge, to and from Sunday school in
order that they may receive a spiritual education and eventually be-
come members of a church organization.
26
A similar situation has arisen in Ohio. In Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A., 27 the
Supreme Court of Ohio refused to extend the earlier decision of Avellone v.
St. John's Hosp.,28 which abolished immunity for charitable hospitals. The
court in Avellone reasoned that the capacity of hospitals to finance liability
costs had increased sufficiently to eliminate the need for special protection.2 9
However, in Gibbon there was no like showing of the financial independence
of religious organizations and thus the court refused to overturn the immunity
rule.30
While the majority in Flagiello goes to great lengths to refute the fictions
used to support the immunity rule, it would seem that the real basis of the deci-
sion is the change in the financial stability of hospitals.5 ' It is their charac-
terization as a business which separates them from other charitable organiza-
tions.32
25. 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955).
26. Id. at 204, 287 P.2d at 130.
27. 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
28. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
29. The court stated:
... the availability of liability insurance and the existing power to purchase
it with hospital funds, coupled with the increased base of remuneration for
services rendered and the efficient business-like management of modern hospitals
certainly tend to negate the argument that to hold the hospital liable . . . would
defeat the charitable purpose....
Id. at 474, 135 N.E.2d at 415.
30. Contra, Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
31. Thus Justice Musmanno states:
Whatever the law may have been regarding charitable institutions in the
past, it does not meet the conditions of today. Charitable enterprises are no
longer housed in ramshackly wooden structures. They are not mere storm
shelters, to succor the traveler and temporarily refuge those stricken in a com-
mon disaster. Hospitals today are growing into mighty edifices in brick, stone,
glass and marble. Many of them maintain large staffs, they use the best equip-
ment that science can devise. . . . But they do all this on a business basis,
submitting invoices for services rendered-and properly so. And if a hospital
functions as a busines institution, by charging and receiving money for what it
offers, it must be a business establishment also in meeting obligations it incurs
in running that establishment.
208 A.2d at 196 (Pa. 1965).
32. It is interesting to note that the religious organizations argued that they were
1965]
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The result reached indicates that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may
be willing to entertain data on the financial self sufficiency of each charitable
institution as a case involving it arises. An adjudication based on such data
would seem to put the court in the position of legislating on the status of a
particular organization without hearing the views of all interested parties.
Such a course of action can only produce the chaos and uncertainty which the
law abhors. Consider the position of the rural Y.M.C.A. after learning that
its urban counterpart has lost its shield of immunity. Can it now proceed with
any amount of assurance that if the situation arises, it may also lose its
protection? Obviously not.
It is therefore suggested that the legislature, with its vast amount of
investigatory resources, is better able to fashion statutory distinctions of im-
munity based on varying financial capacities. Moreover, it could formulate
standards, which operating prospectively,3 3 would obtain the desired stability.
Perhaps the system practiced in New Jersey could be utilized. In 1958, the
New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the immunity rule for hospitals, 84
churches, 3 5 and other charitable institutions.3 " The legislature reacted by
enacting a statute immunizing religious, charitable, and educational organiza-
tions, but affirming liability as to nonprofit hospitals, limiting it to 10,000
dollars.
37
The result reached in Flagiello is undesirable merely because it leaves the
application of the immunity doctrine in a state of uncertainty. Because the
courts have not expressly abolished charitable immunity completely, it ap-
pears that the only solution lies in the form of legislative enactment. Failure
to do so will result in the continued perpetuation of an unsound doctrine.
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similar to hospitals in that they also served a charitable purpose. See Bianchi v. South
Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N.J.L. 325, 8 A.2d 567 (1939). Now the same charities
which once argued they were like nonprofit hospitals in order to obtain the protection
of the immunity doctrine, must argue the converse-that they are not like hospitals-in
order to retain the same protection.
33. A judicial abolition of immunity would operate retroactively. See Gregory
v. Salem General Hosp., 175 Or. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944).
34. Callopsy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J.2d 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958).
35. Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J.2d 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958).
36. Benton v. Y.M.C.A. of Westfield, 27 N.J.2d 67, 141 A.2d 298 (1958).
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 to -11, (1958).
